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 Standards-as-Barriers versus Standards-as-Catalysts: 
Assessing the Impact of HACCP Implementation on U.S. Seafood Imports 
 
As one of the world’s largest producers and importers of fishery products, the issue of 
seafood safety is of particular concern to the United States. Approximately 15 percent of 
the estimated 76 million foodborne illnesses that occur every year in the U.S. are 
attributed to seafood consumption (Mead et al. 1999). The risks associated with domestic 
and imported products motivated the introduction of a mandatory Hazard Analysis 
Critical Control Points (HACCP) approach to food safety regulation in seafood 
processing in 1997. 
In considering the effect of higher food safety standards, such as HACCP 
implementation, the conventional wisdom in the literature held that increased food safety 
standards in developed countries amount to “standards-as-barriers” to trade that are 
frequently used as protectionist tools that disadvantage developing countries. They may 
especially discriminate against developing countries if, contrary to the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) under the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the effective level of enforcement is more rigorous for 
imports than for domestic supplies. On the other hand, a more recent and less pessimistic 
view of the role of food safety standards in trade emphasizes the opportunities provided 
by emerging requirements and the possibility that developing countries could use them to 
increase their competitive advantages. This “standards-as-catalysts” view argues that 
compliance with new food standards may provide various incentives for countries to 
modernize their export-oriented sectors, as well as to strengthen the levels of food and 
health standards at the national level.  
  1 We evaluate these two hypotheses by analyzing the impact of mandatory HACCP 
measures introduced in 1997 on imports to the U.S. by the 35 largest seafood exporting 
countries, of which 27 are developing and 8 developed countries. The data set includes 
the pre-HACCP period 1990-1997 and the post-HACCP period 1998-2004. We test the 
hypotheses by analyzing the overall impact of HACCP adoption on U.S. seafood imports 
and whether there was a differential effect for developed and developing country 
exporters over time. We then test for HACCP trade effects at the individual country level, 
allowing for differential effects not categorized by development status. Our results 
contribute to the discussion of the impact of changing food safety standards on the 
competitiveness of developing countries in international trade and especially of the 
dynamics of market share distribution.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on 
food safety with an emphasis on empirical studies of the potential impact of increased 
food safety standards on international trade and the seafood market. Section 3 outlines 
recent developments in U.S. seafood trade and the implications of adoption of the 
HACCP system. Section 4 introduces the econometric gravity equation approach, 
followed by the description of the panel data set. Results are discussed in Section 5 and 
conclusions in the final section. 
Food Safety and Trade: Empirical Evidence 
There is a fairly extensive literature on the general effects of food safety standards and 
the SPS Agreement on developing countries (see, e.g., Henson, Brouder, and Mitullah 
2000; Buzby 2003; Garcia-Martinez and Poole 2004; Josling, Roberts, and Orden 2004; 
World Bank 2005). In addition, Pinstrup-Andersen (2000), Unnevehr (2000, 2003), 
  2 Jaffee and Henson (2004), Henson and Mittulah (2004), Maertens and Swinnen (2006) 
and Caswell and Bach (Forthcoming) have discussed the implications of major 
differences among food safety standards under the SPS Agreement from the point of 
view of developing countries. These authors agree that stricter national and international 
food safety measures may amount to protectionist non-tariff barriers to trade for many 
developing countries. 
Jaffee and Henson (2004) and the World Bank (2005) argue that standards can act 
to impede trade flows by explicit bans but more probably through prohibitive costs of 
compliance, particularly for poorer countries. The inevitable investment and recurrent 
‘costs of compliance’ to penetrate high income markets could undermine the competitive 
position of many developing countries or narrow the profitability of high-value food 
exports. However, Jaffee and Henson (2004) and the World Bank (2005) highlight 
potential opportunities arising from developments in standards. Certain countries may be 
able to use the new standards environment to their competitive advantage and increase 
their market shares in trade. This possibility depends on closing gaps between growing 
consumer and standards requirements in developed countries and the modernization of 
supply chain structures in export oriented industries in developing countries. Jaffee and 
Henson conclude that the simple black and white argument between food safety 
“standards-as-barriers” and “standards-as-catalysts” is more complex in reality. The issue 
requires close analysis of the dynamics of particular markets, products, and countries in 
order to understand how changing food safety standards affect exports from developing 
countries. 
  3 To date only a few contributions in the economics literature have used empirical 
data to estimate the impact of national and international food safety regulations on trade 
flows (Paarlberg and Lee 1998; Calvin and Krissoff 1998; Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh 
2001; Wilson and Otsuki 2004; Maskus, Otsuki, and Wilson 2005; Peterson and Orden 
2005). A common result is that changes in food safety regulations and more stringent 
safety standards set by developed countries tend to deter trade supporting the view of 
“standards-as-barriers.” Overall, changes in trade patterns related to standards take place 
within the context of broader changes. For example, Carrere (2006) finds that the effects 
of regional trade agreements on trade flows have become quite powerful in explaining 
changing patterns of food trade. 
Seafood markets have attracted less attention even though seafood consumption 
accounts for a disproportionate share of foodborne illnesses in the United States (U.S. 
GAO 2001) and other OECD countries (Cato and Lima dos Santos 1998). Martínez-
Zaroso and Nowak-Lehmann (2004) explore the export potential of MECOSUR countries 
in a liberalized European Union market. This issue is of particular economic importance 
because agricultural and fishery products make up about 40 percent of total MERCOSUR 
exports to the EU. Panel model results suggest strong correlations between the overall 
level of EU market protectionism and the growth rate of MECOSUR exports. In 
particular, the authors found the category of fishery products faced high barriers to trade 
from EU protection.  
Alberini et al. (2005) explore the implications of U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) inspection of seafood imports under the HACCP regulation. Based 
on a theoretical model of enforcement, the authors econometrically reject the hypothesis 
  4 that the FDA performed targeted inspections based on actual HACCP requirements or 
past compliance of firms, which generally supports the view of “standards-as-barriers.” 
However, the results suggest the compliance strategies of firms are largely influenced by 
the threat of inspection of sanitary standards for seafood. 
Debaere (2005) investigates the impact of changing trade policies, in particular 
the EU zero tolerance policy for antibiotics, on the global shrimp market. The author 
shows empirically that the EU policy, mainly the loss of Thailand’s preferential status in 
the EU, enforced differences in international safety standards for shrimp leading to a 
disruption of trade flows from Europe towards the U.S. This trade friction led to a 
significant decrease in U.S. shrimp prices and caused a U.S. anti-dumping case against 
six Asian shrimp exporting countries. Finally, Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000) 
apply a panel model to analyze the economic factors affecting seafood imports into 
France. However, the influence of food safety standards is not central because the impact 
of trade barriers is reflected in a very broad manner that does not account for the effects 
of safety regulations. 
Empirical work on the implications of increased food safety standards contributes 
to the understanding of the economic determinants that affect trade in fishery products. 
However, whether these standards operate predominantly as barriers or catalysts is 
largely unresolved. Much of the analysis of U.S. HACCP requirements for seafood has 
focused on domestic implications, such as the costs and benefits of HACCP adoption. 
The analysis here estimates the magnitude of import changes emerging from stricter food 
safety standards in the form of mandatory HACCP requirements and provides direct tests 
  5 of the hypotheses of “standards-as-barriers” versus “standards-as-catalysts” for 
developing country exports. 
U.S. Seafood Trade, International Food Safety, and HACCP 
Although the United States is one of the world’s largest exporters of seafood, its annual 
trade deficit in fishery products has been rising to nearly $8 billion in the past 15 years 
(NMFS 2005b). Seafood from foreign countries is filling a growing share of the United 
States seafood market, as the expanding U.S. population and increasing awareness of the 
health benefits of seafood continue to promote consumer demand. Overall seafood 
consumption in the United States has increased over 50 percent since 1980. 
By 1998 imported seafood comprised 63 percent of U.S. consumption. The share 
of imports reached a peak of 76 percent of edible seafood consumption in 2002 (NMFS 
2005b). Import volume has increased from 1997-2004 for both developing and developed 
countries. Out of the largest 35 seafood exporters that supplied approximately 95% of the 
U.S. imports from 1996 to 2004, 27 are developing countries
1 that account for 67 percent 
of edible seafood imports (USDA/FAS 2004), and 8 are developed countries
2. The net 
foreign exchange receipts derived from fish in developing countries increased from $11.6 
billion in 1992 to $17.4 billion in 2002. In 2002, developing countries accounted for 
more than 49 percent of the total worldwide value of seafood exports (FAO 2004). 
In 1997, a mandatory HACCP requirement replaced the prior regulatory system 
for the seafood industry in the United States. At the time of its implementation, HACCP 
was seen as a win-win proposition, even though companies had to incur additional costs 
                                                 
1Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, and Viet Nam. 
2Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom. 
  6 for HACCP plan design, control and record keeping procedures, sanitation procedures, 
and training of employees (Colatore and Caswell 2000). The FDA has acknowledged that 
the introduction of HACCP has proven to be complex, as many elements were largely 
unfamiliar to processors, in particular those in major exporting countries. Unnevehr 
(2000) points out that HACCP systems vary widely among developed countries; this 
poses challenges for exporting countries. 
We hypothesize that all else equal the introduction of mandatory HACCP has had 
a negative effect on imports of seafood into the United States. If standards act as barriers 
for developing country exporters, there should be a differential negative effect for these 
countries when compared to developed countries. Developing country exporters may 
deflect export flows to other countries because of increased compliance costs for the U.S. 
market, which deprives them of their comparative trade advantage (World Bank 2005, 
Debaere 2005). U.S. importers may choose not to buy from developing countries as 
safety levels may be lower overall or harder to verify. However, if standards act as 
catalysts for developing countries as a group, we would expect no differential negative 
effect due to HACCP for these countries. Alternatively, it may be that standards operate 
as a barrier or catalyst at the country level independent of development status. In this 
case, we would expect to see differential effects on exports for countries based on 
country characteristics such as the size of the export industry and whether they already 
had relatively high food safety standards, could mobilize to meet HACCP requirements, 
or had lower compliance costs. Further, we examine whether these effects differ in the 
short run immediately after the new standards went into effect versus the longer term. 
  7 The Panel Model Approach to Analysis of HACCP Trade Impacts 
Different methodological approaches have been applied to disentangle the complicated 
trade effects of food safety standards. Maskus, Wilson, and Otsuki (2001) summarize 
alternative approaches to estimating the impact of standards in general on trade. Previous 
studies by Swann, Temple, and Shurmer (1996); van Beers and van den Bergh (1997); 
Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000); and Wilson and Otsuki (2004) discuss the 
advantages of econometric methods, especially the gravity equation approach, for the 
analysis of standards in international trade. Evenett and Keller (1998) supply evidence of 
the accuracy of the gravity equation in predicting various theoretical trade models as the 
equation can be derived from Ricardo, Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson, or increasing return 
to scale models (Bergstrand 1989). 
A major advantage of an econometric approach based on the gravity equation is 
the ability to examine relationships that are most relevant for international seafood trade 
including standards variables and determinants of bilateral trade flows, such as tariff and 
non-tariff trade barriers; transport costs, proxied by the geographical distance between 
trade partners; exchange rates; or the size of the importing and exporting economies. 
Moreover, an econometric approach does not predetermine the direction of the effect of 
standards, in particular with regard to food safety standards, and other trade determinants. 
Thus it can be used for various hypothesis tests. 
The model uses a variant of the classic gravity equation to analyze the effects of 
the U.S. HACCP food safety standard on bilateral trade flows. Logarithms of bilateral 
trade flows, both in real values and quantities, are regressed on the size of each exporting 
country’s seafood sector, introduced as a measure of “mass;” geographical distance; 
  8 foreign exchange rate; and U.S. GDP as a proxy for domestic seafood demand. The trade 
effect of mandatory HACCP in the U.S. is introduced through a policy variable. The 
model also includes variables that explore the effects of regional trade agreements on 
seafood trade flows into the United States. 
The general gravity model is specified as:  
i ) Geo ln( 12 ) ANDEAN ( 11 ) APEC ( 10 ) ASEAN ( 9
) NAFTA ( 8 ) MERCOSUR ( 7 ) i ce tan Dis ln( 6 ) it Exchange ln( 5
) it Size ln( 4 ) t GDP ln( 3 ) it HACCP ( 2 ) Time ( 1 0
x
it ports Im ln
ε α α α α
α α α α
α α α α α
+ + + + +
+ + +




it denotes the imports of seafood from country i to the United States in a 
particular year t for the years 1990-2004 (NMFS 2005a, 2005b). Superscript x stands for 
either the volume of imports (Imports
Q
it) or the dollar value of imported seafood 
(Imports
$
it). The error εi is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero. Table 1 
presents definitions and descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. 
Trade data for Korea and Vietnam were incomplete and dropped yielding a panel-data set 
of the 33 leading exporters to the U.S. 
Time has the value 1 to 14 for the 14 years of observations. HACCP reflects the 
implementation and enforcement of HACCP requirements by the FDA effective in 1998; 
it equals one for 1998 to 2004 and zero in previous years. GDP, as a proxy of income, is 
the real per capita GDP of the United States in 2000 U.S. dollars. Size is a proxy for the 
importance of international seafood trade in each exporting country. It is the sum of 
seafood imports and exports from the FAO’s database “fishstat plus” (FAO 2005). 
Alternatively, “mass” is measured by Export, the value of exports of total goods and 
services of each country. Exchange is the market exchange rate between the U.S. dollar 
  9 and the domestic currency of each exporting country, while Distance is the geographical 
measure of distance from the United States. 
Five variables account for membership in particular regional trade agreements: 
MERCOSUR, NAFTA, ASEAN, APEC, and ANDEAN. Geo is a classification variable, 
indicating geographical connection between seafood exporters and the United States that 
may involve historic ties. As we could not identify clear colonial ties for the United 
States, this variable has three levels controlling for the omitted variable problem of 
country ties in trade flow analysis: trade relations with Asian and Pacific countries are 
captured in Geo1, while Latin American countries are included in Geo2, and Northern 
countries are in Geo3. South Africa is the only African seafood exporting country in the 
data set; it is included in the Asia/Pacific country group. 
The hypotheses for the signs of the first derivatives of the general model variables 
are:  
∂ Imports/∂ HACCP < 0; ∂ Imports/∂ GDP > 0; ∂ Imports/∂ Size > 0; 
∂ Imports/∂ Export > 0; ∂ Imports/∂ Exchange < 0; ∂ Imports/∂ Distance < 0. 
We hypothesize that all else equal adoption of the HACCP standard has had a negative 
impact on U.S. seafood imports, while increases in GDP have had a positive impact. The 
size of the exporting country’s economy (Size or Export) is hypothesized to have a 
positive impact, while the foreign exchange rate to the U.S. Dollar Exchange is expected 
to show a negative sign. The impact of geographical Distance is hypothesized to be 
negative. All other signs are ambiguous; there are different hypotheses on the influence 
of time, trade agreements, and geographical connection. 
  10 Empirical Analysis of HACCP Effects on Seafood Imports 
The panel of fishery product import data is estimated across 33 exporting countries for 
the time period 1990-2004 using alternative model specifications based on the general 
gravity model in equation (1). Tests compare changes in patterns of imports into the 
United States for all, developed, and developing countries after mandatory HACCP 
implementation, short-run (1998 to 1999) versus longer-run (1998-2004) effects for 
developed and developing countries, and individual country level effects. 
Model 1 is the benchmark specification of the gravity equation. It controls for the 
impact of mandatory HACCP requirements for seafood on trade flows into the United 
States. Other included variables are a time trend (Time), the “mass” of the importing 
country (GDP), the size of the exporting country’s seafood sector (Size), exchange rate 
(Exchange), and the geographical distance (Distance):  
i ) i ce tan Dis ln( 6 ) it Exchange ln( 5
) it Size ln( 3 ) t GDP ln( 3 ) it HACCP ( 2 ) Time ( 1 0
x
it ports Im ln
ε α α
α α α α α
+ +
+ + + + + =
(2) 
Model 2 adds variables for regional trade agreements (MERCUSOR, NAFTA, 
ASEAN, APEC, and ANDEAN) allowing for tests of whether these agreements have 
significant effects on seafood imports into the Unites States: 
i ) ANDEN ( 11 ) APEC ( 10 ) ASEAN ( 9 ) NAFTA ( 8
) MERCOSUR ( 7 ) i ce tan Dis ln( 6 ) it Exchange ln( 5
) it Size ln( 4 ) t GDP ln( 3 ) it HACCP ( 2 ) Time ( 1 0
x
it ports Im ln
ε α α α α
α α α
α α α α α
+ + + +
+ + +
+ + + + + =
(3) 
Model 3 introduces alternative specifications for two types of variables in order to 
test the robustness of the results. The value of a country’s total export of goods and 
services (Export) is used as an alternative to test whether the size of an exporting country 
  11 had a differential effect on seafood trade with the U.S. The variables Geo1 and Geo2 are 
used as an alternative specification of country-group specific effects on seafood trade 
previously represented by the regional trade agreement variables. Geo1 includes Latin 
American fishery product exporters, Geo2 is the Asian-Pacific country group, and Geo3 
is Northern European fishery exporters: 
i ) 2 Geo ( 8 ) 1 Geo ( 7 ) i ce tan Dis ln( 6 ) it Exchange ln( 5
) it Export ln( 4 ) t GDP ln( 3 ) it HACCP ( 2 ) Time ( 1 0
x
it ports Im ln
ε α α α α
α α α α α
+ + + +
+ + + + + =
 (4) 
The panel nature of the data may introduce heterogeneity biases requiring 
appropriate econometric methods to separate time-series and cross-sectional effects. 
Initial ordinary least squares panel estimates revealed significant first-order serial 
correlation. We therefore apply Exact Maximum Likelihood estimators (ExactML). The 
parameter estimates are corrected for first-order serial correlation of the residuals and 
stationarity of the time series properties is imposed (Beach and MacKinnon 1978). Given 
the large number of country-pair relations in the data set taken from a larger population, 
we treat the corresponding country effects as random. However, Hausman test results are 
reported with each regression model. 
The choice of the estimation procedure is motivated by different factors. First, 
fixed effect models are inappropriate when time and product invariant variables such as 
geographical distance are included, because fixed effects estimators eliminate all time 
invariant variation (Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004; Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard 2000). 
Consequently, random effects estimators are more appropriate given the importance of 
the distance variable for trade flow analysis. There are good reasons for arguing that 
country-specific fixed effects come to the fore especially when stricter food standards 
  12 may boost or hamper trade flows across countries. Of course, such factors are 
deterministically linked with individual country specifics, which may not be considered 
as random. While Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001); Wilson and Otsuki (2004); and 
Blind and Jungmittag (2005) apply fixed effects models, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) 
and Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000), among others, doubt the appropriateness of 
such models in trade flow analysis. This is especially the case, when time invariant 
geographical distance variables are included in gravity equations, which is the most 
prominent example. 
Overall Effects of HACCP Implementation 
Table 2 presents estimation results for Models 1-3 in two groups. The first uses dollar 
value of imported seafood as the dependent variable, while the second uses the volume of 
imported seafood. The random effects estimates of the gravity models are generally well 
behaved. Double-logarithmic specifications generated the best parameter estimates in all 
models and allow for the direct interpretation of coefficient elasticities. Statistically 
significant F-tests reject the null hypothesis of equivalence of OLS and fixed-effects 
models at the 95-percent level. Fixed-effects models were largely outperformed by 
random-effects models as indicated by the Hausman tests. 
The results presented in Table 2 support the hypothesis that, all else equal, 
mandatory HACCP implementation had an overall negative and significant effect on 
seafood imports into the United States. The elasticities of HACCP effects across model 
specifications are calculated from the estimated model coefficients for this dummy 
variable using the procedure proposed by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) in order to 
produce a theoretically consistent interpretation of the estimated magnitudes. HACCP 
  13 elasticities range from -0.13 to -0.35 percent with respect to the value of imported 
seafood products. This effect translates to an average annual loss in trade value of $11.4 
and $30.6 million, respectively. Import volumes declined up to -0.34 percent or an 
average decrease of 5,535 metric tons. Thus for importers as a whole HACCP posed a 
significant barrier to selling into the U.S. market. In comparison, the gravity equation 
panel model of Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000) shows a significantly negative 
but rather marginal (-0.092) impact of trade barriers on aggregate seafood imports into 
France from 1988-1994. 
The benchmark Model 1 and alternative Models 2 and 3 support a positive time 
trend in seafood imports into the United States with respect to both values and quantities 
of seafood. Real GDP per capita, as a proxy of U.S. per-capita demand, shows a similar 
effect. Our results indicate that a one percent increase in U.S. per-capita GDP led to a 
0.59 percent increase in the value of seafood imports. The magnitude of the volume effect 
on seafood imports with an increase of up to 0.53 percent is of similar magnitude. 
The geographical distance variable shows the hypothesized negative effect on 
seafood trade in all model specifications with the exception of Model 2 for the dollar 
value of imports. The elasticity estimates indicate trade effects from increasing transport 
and transaction costs. However, the magnitudes of these distance effects tend to be lower 
then those of Peridy, Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000) who report a significant distance 
elasticity of -0.742 for seafood imports into France.  
The panel regressions also highlight the significance of the “mass” variable (Size) 
as a major factor in explaining trade flows. The importance of each country’s seafood 
sector, in terms of the total value of fishery trade, has a significant and positive effect on 
  14 its ability to penetrate the U.S. market. This trade facilitating effect is confirmed in the 
alternative specifications for the dollar value of total exports in goods and services 
(Export) as a proxy of country i’s export orientation. A one percent increase in a 
country’s value of total exports is associated with an increase of seafood exports (value 
and volume) of around 0.32 percent.  
The effect of the foreign exchange rate to the U.S. dollar on seafood imports are 
inconclusive across model specifications. This contrasts with a theoretically plausible and 
significant positive exchange rate elasticity of 0.97 reported by Martínez-Zarzoso and 
Nowak-Lehmann (2004) for seafood exports by MERCOSUR countries. Peridy, 
Guillotreau, and Bernard (2000) report a nominal exchange rate elasticity of -0.54. 
The inclusion of regional trade agreement and geographical classification 
variables in Models 2 and 3 provide insights into important factors that impact seafood 
trade flows. To the best of our knowledge this study is the first to explore the effects of 
regional trade agreements and geographical connections among countries on seafood 
trade flows. The results indicate that these factors are significant in explaining flows of 
seafood exports to the United States. For both dependent variables the results reveal 
significant positive effects of relevant trade agreements. NAFTA has the greatest positive 
impact of 9.5 percent on the value of U.S. seafood imports, while exports of APEC-
members are about 2.6 percent higher in terms of volumes
3.  
The impact of geographical connections shows that Latin-American countries 
(Geo1) have better access overall to the U.S. seafood market compared to the residual 
group of northern countries, which is dominated by European fishery nations. Their 
                                                 
3Due to insignificant results the variable MERCOSUR was been dropped from Model 2 for both specifications of the 
independent variable. 
  15 export advantage is 1.7 percent in value of product and 2.5 percent in export volume. In 
contrast, the group of Asian/Pacific countries (Geo2) has a smaller positive competitive 
advantage compared to their European competitors. 
Developing and Developed Country Effects of HACCP Implementation 
To specifically address the “standards-as-barriers” versus “standards-as-catalysts” views, 
we test for differential HACCP effects between developing and developed countries with 
separate panel regressions of the benchmark Model 1. The model allows a focus on the 
differential impact of HACCP on country groups and countries, while accounting for 
other major factors that affect seafood trade with the U.S. 
The “standards as barriers” view hypothesizes a differential negative effect of 
HACCP adoption for developing countries. In contrast, developed countries, which 
largely account for the enforcement of enhanced food quality and safety standards, may 
experience a less negative or a positive effect of HACCP introduction on exports to the 
U.S. Industrialized countries are assumed to have the resources to adapt more quickly to 
increases in standards. Moreover, a drop in exports from developing countries in the post-
HACCP period may allow developed countries to add market share in seafood trade with 
the United States.  
The estimates of HACCP elasticities for U.S. seafood imports for the entire period 
of 1990-2004 (referred to as the long run) from all, developing, and developed countries 
are reported in the upper panel of table 3. As discussed above, HACCP implementation 
had a significantly negative effect on trade flows across all exporting countries when 
measured over the entire long-run time period from 1990-2004 and with controls for 
other determinants of seafood trade such as time, GDP, distance, and export orientation. 
  16 Similarly, the point elasticities of the HACCP trade-flow effects for developing countries 
are consistently negative and significant over this period. Parameter values indicate 
decreased trade flows to the U.S. that exceed overall HACCP impact levels for all 
countries. Developing countries’ relative loss in seafood trade with the U.S. is -0.9 
percent of export value, while export volumes dropped about -0.6 percent. This translates 
to an average annual loss in export value of $56.6 million and an average drop in volume 
of 7,885 metric tons. In contrast, the effect for developed countries is positive but not 
statistically significant for the dollar value of imports and positive and significant in 
terms of volume of seafood imports, which increased by about 0.5 percent or equivalently 
2,244 metric tons. 
Comparing results, Otsuki, Wilson, and Sewadeh (2001) also found a negative 
impact of stricter standards on exports to the EU from developing countries in Africa. 
Their elasticity estimate indicates that tighter standards for Aflatoxin B1 in the EU 
resulted in significant negative trade-flow effects for imports of fruits, nuts, and 
vegetables from African countries. Wilson and Otsuki (2004) found a significant negative 
elasticity effect on imports from the introduction by the EU of a new pesticide standard 
for bananas. European banana imports rise by 1.6 percent with a decrease in the level of 
standards stringency of one percent. Overall, these results support the finding that 
enhanced food safety standards in developed countries can act as barriers resulting in 
significant reductions in exports from developing countries. 
For countries with limited investment resources, it could be argued that the 
successful adoption of food safety standards is a matter of time. For example, Donovan, 
Caswell, and Salay (2001) report a transition period of two months up to five years for 
  17 the implementation and full compliance with HACCP standards in the Brazilian fishery 
processing industry As a consequence, countries that are immediately in compliance may 
expand their market shares at the expense of to those who are not—at least in the short 
run. 
To explore differential effects over time, we compare HACCP elasticities 
estimated over the entire longer-run period 1990-2004, which includes seven years under 
the HACCP requirement (shown in the upper panel of table 3), to those over the shorter 
run period 1990-1999 (shown in the lower panel of table 3), which includes the first two 
years of the HACCP requirement. The results reveal significant differences in the 
magnitude of HACCP effects between the long and short run. For all countries, the short-
run HACCP elasticities are of greater magnitude for both the dollar value and volume of 
seafood imports. The overall long term pattern of a negative HACCP effect on 
developing and a positive effect on developed countries holds in the short term as well. 
Moreover, the results do not show that the negative effect for developing countries began 
to be mitigated in the longer run; the HACPP effects for the two periods do not show a 
significant difference. Overall, the results based on comparisons of developing versus 
developed countries as groups support the hypothesis of “standards as barriers.” 
Country-Specific Effects of HACCP Implementation 
While the previous results support the “standards-as-barriers” hypothesis, these results 
may mask differences in country-level effects within the developing and developed 
country groups. Henson, Brouder, and Mitullah (2000) and Henson and Mittulah (2004) 
suggest that a number of seafood exporting countries have experienced considerable 
problems of complying with food safety requirements. At the same time, other countries 
  18 have managed to comply and increase market shares in high-value markets despite the 
existence and enforcement of stricter standards.  
We estimated pooled time-series cross-section regressions of the country-level 
effects of HACCP requirements using the benchmark Model 1 by combining the random 
and fixed HACCP effects of the 33 countries exporting to the U.S. This allows estimation 
of the country-specific impact of HACCP enforcement, accounting for the combined 
random- and fixed-effect impact of HACCP on each country when other major 
determinants of seafood trade are controlled. Table 4 shows country-level pre-HACCP 
seafood imports and estimates of the short-run (1990-1999) and long run (1990-2004) 
trade flow effects of HACCP. These effects are heterogeneous among developing and 
developed countries, and in some cases in the short versus the long run. 
A surprisingly clear pattern of individual country trade responses emerges based 
on the pre-HACCP size of the country’s seafood exports to the United States. The larger 
exporters gained from the introduction of stricter food-safety regulations. Twelve of the 
top 15 suppliers of seafood to the U.S. had strictly increasing trade flow patterns in the 
short- and long-run post-HACCP periods. In contrast, ten of the 18 smaller exporters 
experienced negative short- and long-run HACCP effects, while an additional 4 
experienced a negative long-term effect. Developing and developed countries are both 
fully represented among the large and small exporters, and thus among the gainers and 
losers, in the post-HACCP adoption period. 
Comparison of short- and long-term effects at the country level underscores that 
the aggregate analysis that shows developing countries losing and developed countries 
gaining under HACCP may be misleading. Among the 25 developing countries that were 
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under HACCP, all else equal. As noted, gainers are concentrated among large exporters 
and losers among small exporters. Among these smaller exporters, the magnitudes of 
negative trade flow effects across developing countries range from -$6.9 to -$44.8 million 
based on the 1997 pre-HACCP export values of seafood products. Meanwhile, among the 
8 developed countries 6 showed gains and 2 losses in the long-run. 
While the HACCP effect for developed countries was predominantly positive, 
developing countries had a mixed experience. Considered on a country level, neither the 
“standards-as-barriers” or “standards-as-catalysts” hypothesis fits developing countries as 
a whole. Instead, the data suggest that among developing countries increased standards 
act as a catalyst for larger, more established exporting countries and a barrier for smaller 
exporters. To our knowledge, this analysis is the first to present estimates of the country-
specific impacts of stricter food-safety standards across a broad panel of bilateral trade 
relations with the U.S. Analyzing trade effects at a disaggregate, country level provides 
valuable information on the impacts of stricter food-safety regulations that is not 
available from a more aggregate analysis. 
Conclusions 
Foodborne safety risks associated with domestic and imported seafood products 
motivated the introduction of mandatory HACCP for seafood products in the U.S. in 
1997. From the point of view of the U.S. and other developed countries, regulatory 
standards such as this are intended to reduce potential risks. However, they can also 
create non-tariff trade barriers and significant trade redirections. The conventional 
wisdom is that increased food safety standards in developed countries amount to 
  20 “standards-as-barriers,” particularly for developing countries. An alternative view sees 
the potential for “standards-as-catalysts,” as developing countries react to new standards 
with increased investment in quality assurance. 
This paper contributes to this discussion by estimating the trade impact of the 
1997 introduction of HACCP in the U.S. for domestic and imported seafood products. 
We apply panel-data on seafood imports to the U.S. by the 33 largest exporting countries 
between 1990 and 2004. Twenty-five of these countries are developing, while 8 are 
developed. The results of extended gravity models indicate a significantly negative 
impact of the HACCP standard on U.S. seafood imports across all 33 exporting countries. 
The results are robust in terms of product values and trade volumes. Comparison of trade 
effects for developing versus developed countries at an aggregate level supports the 
“standards-as-barriers” hypothesis. While developing countries as a group suffered 
significant trade reductions under HACCP, developed countries, again as a group, gained 
under HACCP. 
A different picture emerges, however, based on estimates of country-specific 
HACCP impacts. These reveal considerable differences across countries with regard to 
the pattern of short- and long-run post-HACCP trade-flow effects. A clear majority of the 
larger seafood exporting countries gained increasing trade with the U.S., all else equal, in 
the post HACCP period. In contrast, most smaller exporters experienced short- and long-
run trade losses after the U.S. HACCP standard was adopted. Developing countries were 
among both groups, suggesting that “standards-as-catalysts” applies to larger, more 
established exporters among developing countries and “standards-as-barriers” to smaller 
exporters. 
  21 Overall, the results emphasize the importance of more detailed quantitative 
economic modeling to inform the discussion of the role of food safety standards as non-
tariff barriers in international trade, especially for developing countries. Economic 
analysis of the trade effects of increased food safety measures can be useful in the 
development of more effective food safety systems, in particular by developed countries. 
Such analysis can also support measurement of the welfare effects of food safety 
standards for individual developing countries. 
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  28 Table 1:  Definitions of Variables and Sample Statistics 






Annual volume of imported seafood into the United 




Value of annual seafood imports into the United States by 
country i (Million U.S. Dollars)  216.37 343.70 
Independent Variables 
Time   Trend 1990-2004  8.27  4.67 
HACCPt
Introduction and enforcement of mandatory HACCP 
standards in U.S. seafood (1998-2004 = 1)   0.47 0.50 
GDPt Real per-capita U.S. GDP (1000 US $)  29.53  7.01 
Sizeit
Total annual volume of seafood imports and exports of 
country i  
(Million metric tons) 
1.43 1.51 
Exportit
Annual export value of total goods and services of 
country i  
(Billion US Dollars) 
60.58 95.05 
Distancei
Geographical distance between country i and the U.S. 
(Thousand Miles)  4.92 2.97 
Exchangeit
Real exchange rate between US$ and domestic currency i 
(value of one dollar in terms of domestic currency i)   697.50 2706.34 
Geo 
Geographical connection between fishery exporting 
countries (Latin America = 1; Asia/Pacific = 2; Northern 
= 3) 
1.76 0.73 
MERCOSUR  Dummy variable for MERCOSUR member countries: 
Argentina, Brazil  0.06 0.24 
NAFTA  Dummy variable for NAFTA members countries: 
Mexico, Canada  0.061 0.24 
ASEAN  Dummy variable for ASEAN member countries: 
Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand  0.12 0.32 
APEC 
Dummy variable for APEC member countries: Australia, 
Canada, Chile, China, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand 
0.42 0.49 
ANDEAN  Dummy variable for ANDEAN member countries: 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela  0.12 0.32 
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Export     0.323
*** 
(7.60) 
   0.314
*** 
(6.12) 
NAFTA   2.35
*** 
(6.61) 




ASEAN   0.530
** 
(2.57) 




APEC   0.692
*** 
(3.57) 




ANDEAN   0.645
*** 
(2.64) 
   0.362 
(1.40) 
 
GEO1      1.002
*** 
(4.12) 
   1.260
*** 
(4.42) 
GEO2     -0.053 
(-0.24) 
   0.826
*** 
(34.98) 
Rho ρ  0.83 0.85 0.85 0.79 0.83 0.82 
DW 1.80 1.58 1.66 1.74 1.76 1.74 
Hausman  0.70 4.73 0.12 0.15 0.81 0.14 
Adj. R
2 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.78 0.72 
No.  492 492 492 492 492 492 
F
d 19.97 16.93 25.42 17.25 14.81 23.82 
a Random effect estimates corrected for first-order serial autocorrelation. t-statistics (in parentheses) 
computed with White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Critical F value computed according 
to Leamer (1994, p.114). 
***, ** and * statistically significant at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels, respectively. 
  30 Table 3:  Overall, Short-, and Long-Run Elasticities of HACCP Effects for All, 
Developing, and Developed Countries
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a ExactML random effect estimates of HACCP elasticities based on Model 1 for 1990-2004 (the long run) 
and 1990-1999 (the short run) sub samples of the panel data set. Results are corrected for first-order serial 




* statistically significant at the 99%-, 95%-and 90%-level, respectively.
  31 Table 4: Magnitudes of Country-Specific HACCP Effects on U.S. Seafood Sales
a
  Pre- HACCP Imports 



















Canada 1  1305.92  383.1  +29.3  511.47  +39.2 
Thailand 2  1166.99  357.27  +30.6  433.95  +37.2 
Ecuador 3  714.87  126.12  +17.6  131.85  +18.4 
Mexico 4  492.19  113.49  +23.1  72.66  +14.8 
China 5  321.19  42.67  +13.3  159.80  +49.7 
Chile   6  316.74  76.64  +24.2  231.73  +73.2 
Indonesia 7  251.10  46.14  +18.4  160.81  +64.0 
Russia   8  230.12  -61.53  -26.7  -31.47  -13.7 
Japan 9  203.88  29.48  +14.5  41.32  +20.3 
Taiwan 10  187.34  -26.36  -14.1  -15.04  -8.0 
Iceland 11  184.30  27.71  +15.0  15.09  +0.8 
India 12  170.86  34.34  +20.1  89.15  +52.2 
Philippines 13  139.84  36.23  +25.9  59.93  +42.9 
Bangladesh 14  134.32  -19.83  -14.8  -43.09  -32.1 
New Zealand  15  133.22  17.71  +13.3  53.79  +40.4 
Norway 16  125.50  -38.6  -30.8  -81.13  -64.4 
Panama 17  112.99  -13.11  -11.6  -18.28  -16.2 
Venezuela 18  99.70  -12.89  -12.9  -28.33  -28.4 
Honduras 19  99.39  14.68  +14.8  3.11  +0.3 
Argentina 20  88.79  0.04  +0.05  -12.81  -14.4 
Singapore 21  75.16  -3.81  -5.1  -24.46  -32.5 
Costa Rica  22  73.60  0.51  +0.7  -6.86  -9.3 
Nicaragua 23  71.39  -10.87  -15.2  -7.79  -10.9 
Brazil 24  69.58  1.46  +2.1  33.09  +47.6 
Peru 25  65.77  -22.01  -33.7  -44.76  -68.1 
Australia 26  53.95  5.37  +9.9  42.80  +99.4 
Bahamas 27  39.30  -2.85  -7.1  -13.90  -34.8 
Colombia 28  37.02  -9.11  -24.6  -14.39  -38.9 
South Africa  29  31.06  3.77  +12.1  -13.21  -42.5 
Trinidad and Tobago  30  29.02  2.94  +10.1  -13.22  -45.6 
Guyana 31  28.20  -2.16  -7.7  -10.61  -37.6 
United Kingdom  32  19.50  -2.92  -14.9  +4.95  +25.4 
Denmark 33  17.53  -5.5  -29.7  -8.48  -48.4 
a Results are obtained through ExactML pooled panel regressions corrected for serial correlation. t-statistics 
(in parentheses) computed with White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
b Calculations based on pooled panel regression of benchmark Model 1 for value of seafood imports, n = 
330.  
c Calculation of HACCP effects based on pooled panel regressions of model 1a, n = 495.  
***, 
** and 
* statistically significant at the 99%-, 95%-and 90%-level, respectively. 
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